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INTRODUCTION
Medical malpractice claims are increasing at a rate of about ten
percent per year.' Seven chairmen of neurosurgery departments in
leading New York hospitals have a combined total of twenty-five mal-
practice suits filed against them, seeking an aggregate total of $6.3
million. ' In 1960, total malpractice premiums in the United States
were $60 million; by 1975, the total will be about $1 billion.3 Many
insurance companies have stopped providing professional liability cov-
erage and some physicians have been temporarily unable to obtain
malpractice insurance at any price.
California, although perhaps at the frontier of the medical
malpractice issue, is not atypical. The number of claims per 100
physician policy years there has increased from about twelve in
1968-69 to about twenty-five in 1975.4 In 1974-75, six jury awards
in California were for over-a million dollars each; in the state's entire
history, there have been only sixteen awards of over a million dollars
each.5 Rates for malpractice insurance increased by 400 percent
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between 1968 and 1970, and in Southern California, physicians in high-
risk specialties such as orthopedics or neurosurgery may have premiums
in the $30,000 range.0 In other states, such as Ohio, rate increases
as high as 750 percent in one year have been requested. 7 Physicians,
in turn, are turning the malpractice issue back on itself. Suits have
been filed against insurance companies charging that they are conspir-
ing to limit the availability of malpractice insurance, thus making it
easier for these companies to sell policies which contain provisions
favorable to them." A Florida orthopedic surgeon has filed a $3 million
suit against two former patients and their attorneys, who had previously
sued him for alleged malpractice." Physicians have also begun to strike
for legislative intervention to solve the malpractice crisis.1 These
strikes have resulted in economic chaos, if not potential ruin, for some
hospitals, and at least temporary dislocations in the usual pattern of
obtaining medical care for some people.
In response to these pressures from all sides, legislation which
would affect some aspect of malpractice has either been introduced in
the legislature or is in preparation in all but three states-Virginia,
Wyoming, and Mississippi.1" In addition, four federal bills are pending
for consideration by the Congress.' 2 Much of the proposed legislation
would radically alter the malpractice system, the principle elements of
which include: (1) patient responsibility to recognize when an injury
has occurred; (2) patient responsibility to determine whether that
injury might be due to negligence; (3) patient responsibility to
approach the legal system to determine if he should receive a settle-
ment for the injury which has occurred; and (4) resolution of the claim
through the tort system, which pits the physician and his insurance
company against the patient and his lawyer.
Some of the arguments for or against changes in the malpractice
system are concerned with the impact of the present and future systems
6. See note 58 infra.
7. Curran, Malpractice Insurance: A Genuine National Crisis, 292 NEw ENG. J.
MnD. 1223 (1975).
8. Now Doctors Charge Insurers With Malpractice, supra note 3, at 40.
9. Rosenberg, He Sued His Malpractice Accusers Right Back-For $3,000,000,
MED. EcoN. Dec. 8, 1975, at 69.
10. L.A. Times, Jan. 9, 1976, § 1, at 1, col. 2; id., Dec. 30, 1975, § 1, at 1, col.
2; N.Y. Times, June 15, 1975, § 4, at 6, col. 1; id. June 2, 1975, at 1, col. 1; id., May
4, 1975, § 4, at 3, col. 2. The American Medical Association House of Delegates offi-
cially approved the use of "slowdowns." Altman, A.M.A. Backs Doctors Curbing Serv-
ice, N.Y. Times, June 18, 1975, at 81, col. 1.
11. See note 93 infra.
12. See note 118 infra.
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on the quality of medical care provided, and this Article is addressed
to that issue. Specifically, the Article is divided into three parts: (1)
consideration of quality-of-care constructs, including the art-of-care,
technical care, quality-of-care assessment, and quality-assurance pro-
grams; (2) the relationship of malpractice to quality of care, with
emphasis on insurance premiums and on availability of physicians; and
(3) the development of policy and research suggestions for understand-
ing and/or altering the present malpractice system.
QUALITY-OF-CARE CONSTRUCTS
Interest in measuring the quality of medical care and then using
the results of this assessment to improve the quality of care delivered
is at least 100 years old. Florence Nightingale studied the medical
facilities available to the British Army during the Crimean War"' and
developed a simple reporting system to highlight the unsafe conditions
-which existed in army field hospitals. Her work indicated that ohanges
in sanitary conditions in these hospitals could produce dramatic reduc-
tions in case-fatality rates. In order to promote changes, she developed
widely published charts which graphically depicted the high death rate
of soldiers in these hospitals.
In 1908, Ernest W. H. Groves, a surgeon at the Bristol General
Hospital, issued a plea for the uniform registration of results of opera-
tions. 4 In pursuit of this goal, he conducted a survey of the fifty
British hospitals with over 200 beds, receiving replies from twenty-
seven hospitals. Results of the survey showed that there was a forty-four
percent operative mortality from radical operations for malignant
diseases of the stomach, a twenty-four percent mortality from prostatec-
tomies, and a nine percent mortality from appendectomies. The per-
sonnel in the hospitals which responded to his questionnaire considered
it desirable and feasible to institute a system for routinely recording
results of operations, but little came of this sentiment.15
A few years later in the United States, Ernest A. Codman, a sur-
geon at the Massachusetts General Hospital, attempted to determine
13. F. NIG=TNGALE, Proposal for Improved Statistics of Surgical Operations, in
NoTEs ON HosPrrALs 171 (3d ed. 1863).
14. Groves, A Plea for Uniform Registration of Operation Results, 2 Barr. MED.
J. 1008, 1008-09 (1908). The basis for Groves's plea was:
If... a surgeon makes a specialty of some disease or operation and tabulates
all his own results, or another by chance has some notable successes and
records them, or the author of a textbook collects published records of various
writers and summarizes them, is it not obvious that such collection of figures




whether patients were well treated by instituting a follow-up system at
the hospital.:' The objective of this system was to raise his own level of
performance by examining all the patients on whom he had operated, one
year after their operations. After being thoroughly frustrated in these
efforts, he resigned his position as a professor of surgery and started
his own hospital in which he instituted a follow-up system. Each
patient on whom he had operated was recalled a year later and his
health reassessed in terms of the original objectives of the initial opera-
tion. From this assessment, Codman determined whether his original
diagnosis was correct, whether his operation was a technical success,
whether the patient benefited from the operation, and whether he had
produced untoward iatrogenic effect by operating on this patient.1 7
Despite this century-old interest in quality of care, there is little
agreement on a precise definition of quality of care; how to measure
it; what, if any, deficiencies exist in the care provided; and how, if
necessary, to improve it. The quality-of-care problem takes on a
special significance in the midst of the current medical malpractice
crisis. Yet despite the absence of an agreement on any precise defini-
tion of quality of care, its measurement, and how to improve it, certain
generic principles are relevant to the discussion which will follow.
Art-of-Care
Any definition of quality of care must contain at least two
constructs: the art-of-care provided and the technical aspect of the care
provided. The art-of-care refers to what Professor Donabedian 8
would call the management of the social, economic, and cultural aspects
of the physician-patient relationship. Increasing the art-of-care would
result in: (1) adoption by the patient of a life style conducive to
16. Codman, The Product of a Hospital, 18 SURGERY, GYNECOLOGY & OBsTErmcs
491 (1914). Expressing his concern over the quality of care, Codman lamented:
One might say that the instruction of the students is irrespective of the
results to the patients, but let us suppose, in surgery, for example, that all the
operations which have been watched by these students have been misdirected
efforts at the cure of disease, and the students have learned to do something
which is not worth while and does not really improve the patient. The
product of the hospital in this case, even as regards student instruction, would
be nil-even worse than nil. We are, therefore, referred again to the classifi-
cation of disease and the results to the patients, because a student would
naturally wish to receive his instruction at a hospital where the treatment was
shown to be of benefit to the patient. We may, then, say that the product of
the hospital in medical education, like the product in the number of cases
treated, depends on whether or not the cases are well treated. . . . Id. at 492.
17. E. CODMAN, A STUDY IN HOSPITAL EFFIcmNcY: Tim FIRST FIvE YEARs
(1916).
18. Donabedian, Promoting Quality Through Evaluating the Process of Patient
Care, 6 MED. CARE 181 (1968).
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longevity; (2) increased compliance by the patient with regimens for
controlling asymptomatic or mildly symptomatic chronic disease; (3)
willingness on the part of the patient to discuss "sensitive" symptoms
and health problems with the physician; and (4) utilization of health
services in a timely manner so that symptoms or problems would be
dealt with at a stage when they can be cured or ameliorated.
Valid measures for assessing the art-of-care are just now being
developed.19 Thus, there is a dearth of information on how the art-
of-care varies as a function of physician or medical care system charac-
teristics. For instance, the question of whether an internist or family
practitioner provides a higher level of art-of-care cannot be answered
by available information. Likewise, no information is available to
answer the question of whether the physician-patient relationship has
deteriorated in the last decade.20 Clearly, the belief that malpractice
suits have increased because the doctor-patient relationship has de-
teriorated can be neither confirmed nor denied by objective informa-
tion.
Technical Care
Measurement of the technical aspect of care concerns whether (1)
the diagnosis was adequately established; (2) therapy was appropriate;
(3) diagnostic and therapeutic procedures were applied in an efficient
manner; (4) medical technology was reasonably exploited; and (5)
appropriate professional measures and facilities were used. Numerous
research or quasi-research studies have assessed or evaluated the tech-
nical aspects of care;21 most of these have reported substantial deficien-
cies in the care provided. Examples include the following cases:
anemia was not recognized or treated in forty-five percent of the
anemic children being cared for at a Children and Youth project which
was providing "comprehensive!' care; one half of these children were
anemic at the end of the study.2 One eighth of all hospital admissions
of Teamsters Union family members in New York City were considered
medically unnecessary, and two fifths of those admitted received only
19. See Ware & Snyder, Dimensions of Patient Attitudes Regarding Doctors and
Medical Care Services, 13 MED. CARE 669, 670 (1975).
20. But cf. Mechanic, Some Social Aspects of the Medical Malpractice Dilemma,
1975 D=. L.J 1179, 1183-84.
21. See, e.g., BROOK, QUALrrY OF CARE AssssimNT: A CONTA.USON OF Frvm
METHODS OF PER REvmw (1973) (DHEW Publication No. HRA-74-3100).
22. Starfield & Sheff, Effectiveness of Pediatric Care: Tile Relationship Between
Processes and Outcome, 49 PEDIATR cS 547 (1972).
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fair or poor care. 3 Only one fourth of patients with severe gastrointes-
tinal symptoms who presented themselves to the emergency room of
either a university24 or a city hospital25 were judged to have received
a level of care which met even minimum standards. One third of North
Carolina's general practitioners were found to be delivering a poor or
marginal level of care.20 Fifty-one percent of a sample of Ontario physi-
cians and twenty-six percent of a sample of Nova Scotia physicians were
found to be practicing medicine of satisfactory quality. Examination
of the quality of care given by Hawaiian physicians demonstrated
deficiencies in both the hospital and ambulatory settings; provision of
good care would have required increasing the taking and recording of
medical histories and physical examinations, performing more labora-
tory tests, and providing more follow-up care.28
Technical care, therefore, has been shown to be deficient
regardless of how it is paid for, who provides it, or in what setting it
is provided. In the absence of adequate mechanisms and finances to
assess and improve the quality of care provided, this situation should
not be unexpected.
Quality-of-Care Assessment
Quality-of-care assessment is hampered by methodologies and
problems of real policy relevance. Quality of care can be assessed by
three different variables: structural, process, or outcome. Structural
variables are innate characteristics of facilities and physicians, such as
whether a poison chart is posted in an emergency room, or the age
23. R. TRUSSELL, M. MoREEAD & J. EHRLICH, Tim QUANTITY, QUALITY AND COSTS
OF MEDICAL AND HOSPITAL CARE SECURED BY A SAMPLE OF TEAMSrER FAmilIES IN THE
NEW YoRx AREA 21, 25 (1962).
24. Brook, Berg & Schechter, Effectiveness of Non-emergency Care Via an Emer-
gency Room: A Study of 166 Patients with Gastro-intestinal Symptoms, 78 ANNALS OF
INTERNAL MED. 333, 337 (1973).
25. Brook & Stevenson, Effectiveness of Patient Care in an Emergency Room, 283
NEw ENo. J. MED. 904, 907 (1970).
26. Peterson, Andrews & Spain, An Analytical Study of North Carolina General
Practice 1953-1954 (pt. U1), 31 J. MED. EDuc. 1 (No. 12 1956).
27. Clute, The Quality of General Practice, in GENERAL PRAcTITIoNER 262-340
(1963).
28. B. PAYNE & T. LYONS, METHOD OF EVALUATING AND INMPROVING PERSONAL MED-
ICAL CARE QuALmrr: OFFICE CARm STUDY (Am. Hosp. Ass'n, In Press); B. PAYNE &
T. LYONS, METHOD OF EVALUATING AND IMPROVING PERSONAL MEDICAL CARE QUALITY:
EPISODE O ILLNESS STUDY (Am. Hosp. Ass'n, In Press). Simple calculations on data
from these studies suggest that the number of ambulatory procedures might need to be
doubled and the number of inpatient procedures increased by one half to meet reasonable
standards of good care.
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or board certification status of the physician. Process variables refer
to what a physician or other health provider does to or for a patient,
such as whether a cardiogram is ordered for a patient with crushing
chest pain. Outcome variables are those concerned with what happens
to a patient and are measured by mortality, morbidity, disability, and
psychosocial functioning.
The purpose of the medical care system is to improve the health
of people, a goal which is not necessarily synonymous with either rais-
ing the qualifications of health care providers or increasing the number
of services provided. The most valid assessment of quality of care is
gained through outcome information. Regulation of the medical care
system, however, depends upon information which can be collected
inexpensively; to date, this has meant relying on structural and process
information which can be obtained from routine reports, insurance
claims forms, or the medical record. Collection of outcome information
usually requires arranging for a follow-up interview with the patient,
an extremely expensive procedure. Unfortunately, many structural
and process items used to assess care have been shown not to be valid,
i.e. not related to improvement in patient health. For example, physi-
cians who are specialists, who graduated high in their medical school
classes, who attend continuing education courses, or who subscribe to
(and read) journals are not necessarily better physicians.2 9 Compre-
hensive care clinics do not necessarily provide better technical care than
do hospital outpatient clinics.30 The only two structural variables which
consistently seem to relate to better quality of care are whether the
physician is a "modal" specialist and whether he is young. 1 In some,
but not all, studies, board-certified physicians performed better than
their noncertified colleagues. 32
Similarly, much of what is known about which processes of care are
related to improved health is based on conventional wisdom, and tests
29. See Peterson, Andrews & Spain, supra note 26, at 71, 83, 88.
30. Morehead, Donaldson & Seravalli, Comparisons Between OEO Neighborhood
Health Centers and Other Health Care Providers of Ratings of the Quality of Health
Care, 61 AM. J. PuB. HEALTH 1294, 1306 (1971).
31. B. PAYNE & T. LYONS, EPISODE OF ILLNESS STuDY, supra note 28. The term
"modal specialist" refers to treatment of a patient by a physician who is trained to treat
the specific problem the patient has. For example, the modal specialist for a child with
a kidney stone is a urologist, and not a family practitioner.
32. See R. TRuSSELL, M. MoaEIEAD & J. ERLICH, supra note 23, at 45-46, 83 table
34; B. PAYNE & T. LYONS, EPISODE OF ILLNESS STumY, supra note 28; R. BRoox & K.
WILLIAMS, EFFECT OF THE NEw MExIco PEER REvmw SYSTEM ON COST AND QuALITY
OF MEDICAL CARE: A REVIEW OF THE IMPACT OF THE NEW MEXICO EPEEIMENTAL
MEDICAL CARE REvIEw ORGANIZATION ON MEDICAL CARE DELIVERED TO THE MEDICAID
POPULATION, 1971-1973 (Rand Corporation, To Be Published).
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of conventional wisdom sometimes produce disturbing results. For
instance, not all women with breast cancer necessarily need a radical
mastectomy; 83 treatment of adult onset diabetes with oral hypoglycemic
agents probably does more harm than good;3 4 some groups of patients
who have acute heart attacks may, on the average, have a higher prob-
ability of survival when treated at home than when treated in a modem
coronary care unit; 3 and many women with varicose veins will obtain
an equally acceptable cosmetic result with less morbid complications
when treated with a simple outpatient procedure than with the conven-
tional operation which requires hospitalization.36 Yet all the more
aggressive procedures are still standard accepted therapy, and likely
would be the benchmark by which acceptable quality of care would be
judged in any national medical care review system.
Regulation on the basis of structural or process information must
be done carefully. No matter what variable (structural, process, or
outcome) is used in quality assessment, deficiencies in care will be
found, but the level of those deficiencies will vary considerably as a
function of the assessment method used."7 If quality-of-care assess-
ment on the basis of process data differs markedly from assessment on
the basis of outcome data, acceptance of the former as a basis for taking
steps to improve care might lead to large increases in the amount of
money spent on personal medical care without a corresponding improve-
ment in the health of the American people. 8
33. See Meier, Statistics and Medical Experimentation, 31 BiocmmIcs 511, 515-16
(1975).
34. The University Group Diabetes Program, A Study of the Effects of Hypo-
glycemic Agents on Vascular Complications in Patients with Adult Onset Diabetes, 19
DruBngrs Supp. 2 (1970). The UGDP study suggests that the specific hypoglycemic
used-tolbutamide-raises the incidence of cardio-vascular illness in diabetic patients.
The study, however, did not extend its findings to include other hypoglycemic agents.
35. Mather, Pearson & Reed, Acute Myocardial Infarction: Home and Hospital
Treatment, 3 BRrr. MmD. J. 334 (1971).
36. Chant, Jones & Weddell, Varicose Veins: A Comparison of Surgery and Injec-
tion/Compression Sclerotherapy, 2 LANCET 11-88 (1972); Piachaud & Weddell, Cost
of Treating Varicose Veins, 2 LANCET 1191 (1972).
37. For a study demonstrating this variance, see Brook, supra note 21. Using
process and outcome data, Brook assessed the quality of care delivered to 296 patients
with either an ulcer in the stomach or duodenum, hypertension, or a urinary tract infec-
tion. Process assessment indicated that twenty-three percent of patients received accept-
able care, but outcome assessment indicated that sixty-three percent of patients re-
ceived acceptable care. Id. at iii. The truth undoubtedly lies somewhere in between,
and the decision of how care should be improved is dependent upon which number is
accepted. Id.




Attempts to assess quality of care have been confined largely to
research endeavors. In the last two years, however, two major quality-
assurance programs have been developed. 9 The first is the Profes-
sional Standards Review Organization (PSRO) program, which has
been established to review and improve the quality and efficiency of
hospital care given to Medicare and Medicaid recipients.4 0 The second
is the Physician Evaluation Performance (PEP) program of the Joint
Commission on the Accreditation of Hospitals, which requires the per-
formance of process and outcome audits for the maintenance of hospital
accreditation.41
Both programs contain similar features: (1) review of hospital
care only; (2) selection of a few diagnostic categories for audit; (3)
local determination by physicians of the diagnostic categories for audit
and of the criteria and standards against which care will be audited;
(4) reaudit to determine if deficiencies have been corrected; and (5)
reporting of results to an external body-the federal government or
the Joint Commission. Both PSRO and PEP have virtually excluded
the public from any real role in quality assurance. For instance, in
order to implement the PSRO program, the United States has been
divided into 203 areas. In each of these areas a group composed solely
of physicians has the right to organize the PSRO, with the public ex-
cluded from any role at the local level. Determination of whether local
PSROs and PEPs work is left mostly to imagination, since the system
by which PSROs and PEPs are evaluated is weak.41 It is too early to
tell whether either one or both of these programs will contribute to im-
proving the health of the American people.
RELATIONSHIP OF MALPRACTICE TO QUALITY OF CARE
Facts about the operation of the present medical malpractice
system are sparse. Those that both relate to the quality-of-care issue
and are consistent among observers of the malpractice system are even
more sparse. Nevertheless, certain facts which are germane to an
39. Because of their very recent implementation, it is of course too early to predict
whether either one or both of these programs will contribute to improving the health
of the American people.
40. 42 U.S.C. §§ 1320C-1 to C-19 (Supp. II- 1973). See OFFICE OF PROFESSIONAL
STANDARDS RniV w, PSRO PROGRAM MANUAL (1974) (HEW Publication).
41. See C. JACOBS & N. JACOBS, THE PEP Prumia: THE JCAII PERORMANCE
EVALUATION PROCEDURE FOR AUDITING AND IMPROVING PHysIcIAN CARE (1974).
42. R. BROOK & A. AvERY, QUALITY ASSURANCE MECHANISMS IN THE UNITED
STATES: FROM THERE To WHERE? 15 (Rand Corp. Paper Series, P-5520, Oct., 1975).
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examination of the relationship between malpractice and the quality of
medical care can be identified.
Malpractice premiums have increased dramatically in the last few
years, and even larger increases have been proposed.43 This increase
in premiums has paralleled a rise in the number of malpractice claims,
and there are predictions that every practicing physician will be sued
at least once in his lifetime.44 Premiums vary substantially by area of
the country, 45 and are set principally according to the amount and type
of surgery a physician does.4  Certain surgical specialists and anes-
thesiologists pay much higher premiums than internists or pediatricians,
and are the targets of many more malpractice claims.47
Malpractice premiums are, in general, not experience-rated at the
individual physician level.48  A physician who practices part-time is
likely to have a premium similar to one who practices full-time; a pedia-
trician who sees 100 patients per day probably will have the same
premium as one who sees ten patients per day; and a physician with
a malpractice claim pending will have the same premium as one who
43. In Ohio, increases of 750 percent in a year have been proposed. Curran, supra
note 7, at 1223-24.
44. Liability Versus Protection, MED. EcoN., Oct. 29, 1973, at 93.
45. State by State Survey, supra note 4. See Steves, A Proposal to Improve the Cost
to Benefit Relationships in the Professional Liability Insurance System, 1975 DU=n
L.J. 1305, 1319.
46. A general practitioner, pediatrician, or internist who does not perform even
minor surgery may have a premium one-seventh that charged an orthopedic surgeon.
Kendall & Haldi, The Medical Malpractice Insurance Market, in MEDICAL MALPRACTICE
REPORT Appendix 494, 505. Specialists in the areas of orthopedic surgery, neurosurgery,
anesthesiology, and obstetrics-gynecology have the highest premiums. Cf. Steves, supra
note 45, at 1316-17 & n.65.
47. A survey of medical malpractice incidents in Maryland during the decade from
1960 to 1970 revealed that slightly more than half of the malpractice claims were associ-
ated with four high-risk specialties: general surgery, eighty-six claims; obstetrics-gyne-
cology, sixty-eight claims; anesthesiology, thirty-six claims; and thoracic surgery, nine
claims. These specialists, however, comprised only one fourth of the physician member-
ship insured under the program being studied. Evans, Hemelt & Olsson, A Survey of
Professional Liability Incidence in Maryland, in MEDICAL MALPRACTICE REPORT Appen-
dix 623; Pabst, Comments on the Maryland Professional Liability Survey, in MEDICAL
MALPRACTICE REPORT Appendix 632.
An examination of all claims closed throughout the United States in 1970 substan-
tiated these findings concerning the skewed distribution of malpractice claims. Rudov,
Myers & Mirabella, Medical Malpractice Insurance Claims Files Closed in 1970, in
MEDICAL MALPRACTICE REPORT Appendix 1. For example, anesthesiologists produced
7.9 percent of the malpractice claims, but represent 3.6 percent of the U.S. physician
pool; orthopedic surgeons produced 8.8 percent of the claims, but represent only 3.2 per-
cent of the pool. Similar figures for internists are 6.9 and 14.0 percent, respectively,
and for pediatricians 2.3 and 6.0 percent. Id. at 16.
48. See Kendall & Haldi, supra note 46, at 533-34,
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does not. Further, the likelihood of a physician being sued does not
vary markedly with personal or professional characteristics, with the
exceptions of specialty and area of the country in which he practices.
For instance, age, board certification, urban versus rural practice, and
foreign medical training seem to have little bearing on the frequency
of involvement in litigation.49 It also appears that the likelihood of a
physician being sued more than once is related as much to chance as
to his being a poor physician."0 Finally, the probability of being sued
varies with the practice site in which care was given: a higher per-
centage of malpractice incidents occurs within a hospital treatment
setting than during office visits.51
49. Examination of malpractice claims closed in 1970 indicated that sixty percent
of the physicians involved in a claim were board-certified; the age distribution of physi-
cians who were sued did not differ from that of the U.S. physician population as a
whole. Rudov, Myers & Mirabella, supra note 47, at 16-17.
Examination of 3,166 physicians insured under the Maryland Med-Chi program
from 1960 to 1970 indicated that of the 322 physicians sued, forty-nine percent were
board-certified. Board-certified physicians were just as likely to be sued multiple times
as were nonboard-certified physicians. Furthermore, urban physicians were only slightly
more likely to be sued than were rural physicians. Fifteen percent of the claims were
against graduates of foreign, non-English-speaking medical schools, but nineteen percent
of the physicians had been educated in such schools. Thus, physicians who were older,
not board-certified, or foreign trained--characteristics which have been associated in
some studies with the provision of a lower level of quality of care-do not appear to
account for a larger proportion of malpractice claims than would be expected by chance
alone. Evans, Hemelt & OIsson, supra note 47, at 626-27; Pabst, supra note 47, at 634.
This conclusion is weakened somewhat by the manner in which the data from the studies
quoted above were analyzed. When the relationship between age or board certification
and the number of malpractice claims was determined, specialty was not taken into ac-
count. Specialty is highly correlated with the number of malpractice claims. If spe-
cialty also has a high correlation with age or board certification status, then a signifi-
cant relationship between age or board certification status and the number of malprac-
tice claims could have been missed.
50. Of the 3,166 physicians insured under the Med-Chi program in Maryland from
1960 to 1970, 2,844 (ninety percent) were not sued; 276 (nine percent) were sued once;
and forty-six physicians (1.4 percent) were sued more than once each for a total of 105
times. Evans, Hemelt & Olsson, supra note 47, at 624, 630; see Pabst, supra note 47,
at 633-34. Chance would predict that twenty-one physicians would have had more than
one claim filed against them. Id. at 634. If the analysis which produced the number
twenty-one had corrected for the variation in suit by specialty, then the deviation from
chance would have been even less. Generalization of the results of this one-state study
is dangerous, however. More studies are required before definitive conclusions can be
drawn.
51. Seventy percent of the malpractice incidents in Maryland between 1960 and
1970 occurred in hospitals, with fourteen percent occurring in emergency rooms, and
twenty-nine percent took place in physicians' offices. Evans, Hemelt & Olsson, supra
note 47 at 629-30. Hospital accreditation did not protect the hospital from being sued,
since ninety-one percent of the hospitals which settled a malpractice claim in 1970 were
JCAH-accredited. Rudov, Myers & Mirabella, supra note 47, at 17.
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Facts from the patients' perspective are equally revealing. For
example, a study of a sample of medical records of patients hospitalized
at two typical community hospitals indicated the following: among
23,750 patients discharged during one year, 1,780 patient injuries
occurred; 517 of these injuries resulted from negligence; and thirty-one
malpractice claims were filed against the hospital or medical staff. 2
Since detection of injury was dependent upon its having been noted in
the medical record, the actual injury and negligence figures may have
been higher.
These data become more meaningful in light of principles estab-
lished in other studies. For instance, it would appear that the
negligence resulting in the 517 injuries for which claims could have
been filed was based on improper treatment in 445 (eighty-six per-
cent) of the cases and on failure to diagnose properly in seventy-two
(fourteen percent) of the cases. Forty percent of the claim incidents
result in eventual payment to the claimant. Although the median pay-
ment has been small ($2,000), three percent of claims will exceed
$100,000. 53 Of all patients who suffer an injury in a hospital, 0.7 per-
cent are compensated; of all patients who suffer a hospital injury due to
negligence, 2.4 percent are compensated. These figures, coupled with
the fact that only eighteen to twenty percent of the premium dollar is
returned to the patient," indicate that the current malpractice restitution
system is not particularly effective or rewarding.
Any examination of the interaction between malpractice issues
and quality of health care that ventures beyond the facts noted above
must be based largely on logic because of the sparsity of reliable data.
The malpractice system seemingly could affect quality of care in three
principal ways: (1) premium differentials could influence the types
of physicians available in various areas of the country; (2) unsuccess-
ful defense of a malpractice claim could lead to direct sanctions against
a health care provider or facility; and (3) the atmosphere of the mal-
practice crisis, even in the absence of a claim, could affect the
52. Pocincki, Dogger & Schwartz, The Incidence of latrogenic Injuries, in MEDICAL
MALPRACTICE REPORT Appendix 50.
53. Rudov, Myers & Mirabella, supra note 47, at 1.
54. Welch, Medical Malpractice, 292 NEw ENG. J. MED. 1372, 1375 (1975). Data
published in a 1969 Senate subcommittee report indicated that approximately twenty-
seven cents of the premium dollar reached the patient in 1968. Report of AMA Board
of Trustees to 1969 AMA Convention, in SE-NATE StBCOMM. ON ExEcurVE REORGANIZA-
TION TO THE COMMrrTEE ON GOVERNMENT OPERATIONS, 91ST CONG., Isr SEss., MEDI-
CAL MALPRACnTCE: THm PATIENT VERsus Tm PHYsIrCAN 1001-02 (Comm. Print 1969).
Other estimates place the percentage return to the patient as high as thirty-eight percent.
See id. at 10 (Introductory statement of Sen. Ribicoff).
1208 [Vol. 1975:1197
QUALITY OF CARE
physician-patient relationship. Before discussing each proposed effect
in detail, however, it is necessary to place the whole issue in some
historical perspective.
Forty years ago, the primary function of the medical care system
was the compassionate caring for patients. Malpractice resulting from
an injury caused by improper therapy was almost an impossibility, since
most therapies were placebos and capable neither of alleviating a
disease nor of causing harm. Today, due to advances in the biomedical
sciences, another function of medical care must also be considered:
efficient delivery to the entire population of efficacious medical services
that result in cure or control of disease and maintenance or improve-
ment of health. Unfortunately, new therapies-antibiotics, intensive
care units, radical surgical procedures, anti-neoplastic drugs-which do
improve the health of the American people are also capable of produc-
ing serious iatrogenic disease. The effectiveness of these therapies is
determined in part by the methods and manner by which they are
applied, in short, by the level of quality of care. The apparently para-
doxical situation which obtains today-namely, improvement in the
health of the American people due to better medical care accompanied
by an increase in malpractice claims-is not too difficult to explain:
modem medicine has increased the physician's chance of doing harm,
and the probabilistic nature of medical treatment alone would suggest
that malpractice claims would dramatically increase. Variation in
physician performance or choice of therapy, which in 1935 was rela-
tively meaningless, today can have serious consequences in terms of
patient well-being. This variation, coupled with the rising public
expectation of increased longevity fostered by the biomedical revolu-
tion, renders the health care atmosphere even more conducive to the
filing of malpractice claims.
Given this historical relationship between quality of care and the
malpractice issue, the central question of this Article can be posed. In
the absence of the present restitution system for medical malpractice,
would the quality of medical care and (thereby) the health level of the
American people increase more or less than it would if the present
malpractice system were kept in place? A direct and simple answer to
this question is impossible, but approximations can be obtained by look-
ing at possible effects of the malpractice system on quality.
Malpractice Premiums and Availability of Physicians
Given both that the amount of malpractice premiums will continue
to rise dramatically and that differentials in premiums will continue to
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occur as a function of physician characteristics, several major system
effects might be hypothesized:
1. Decrease in the number of applicants to medical school;
2. Decrease in the number of physicians who specialize in high-risk
specialties (e.g., orthopedics);
3. Migration of physicians from areas in the country with high
premiums to those with low premiums;
4. Decrease in the number of part-time practicing physicians;
5. Decreases in the performance of surgery or special procedures;
6. Increase in the cost of care;
7. Decrease in the number of young physicians who go directly from
training into solo fee-for-service practice; and
8. Increase in physician slowdowns or strikes which will either tem-
porarily or permanently make medical care unavailable.
Each of these hypothetical effects merits some comment.
Application Rate to Medical School. In the near future, primary
care physicians in private fee-for-service practice may be paying $5,000
to $10,000 for malpractice insurance; this would be the lower end of
the premium scale. It is unlikely that this premium level, in and of
itself, would cause the number of applicants to medical school to drop.55
Whether some or many students enter medical school for economic
reasons is debatable. Not debatable, however, is the fact that these
"high" premiums on the average represent a very small percentage
(five to ten percent) of the physician's gross salary.5" On the whole,
physicians will remain at the top of the economic ladder, regardless of
the level of malpractice premiums. During hard economic times, the
M.D. degree is the only degree which guarantees job stability; this fact
alone will continue to lead a large excess of highly qualified applicants
to medical school. High malpractice premiums (at least at the levels
55. The number of applicants for admission to the 1974-75 term in United States
medical schools was 42,624, an increase of 2,118 over the previous year. Crowley (ed.),
Medical Education in the United States 1974-75, 234 J.A.M.A. 1333, 1337 table 8
(1975). The number of students applying has increased 122 percent in the last ten
years, id. at 1336, although the most recent increase is not so large as the previous year's
gain of 4,371 applicants, id. at 1337 table 8.
56. The average gross income for all physicians during 1973 has been estimated at
almost $84,000. CmEIrR FOR HEALTH SmVicEs RESEARCH Am DEvELoP ENT, Am.
MED. Ass'N, PROFmE OF MEoicAL PRACTICE 195 table 66, and 204 table 75 (1974).
Net income for the same period was estimated at approximately $50,000. Id. at 195
table 66. The estimates were based on approximately 3,000 observations. Average
net income was based only on those physicians reporting a profit.
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now being proposed in Southern California) will not cause or aggravate
a "physician shortage," if such a phenomenon indeed exists. 57
Training of Physicians in High-risk Specialties. In Southern Cali-
fornia, by 1976, the premium differential between a surgeon and an
internist may be $30,000.58 One might argue that this discrepancy
would lead to the training of fewer medical school graduates as sur-
geons, but there is no evidence that this outcome would occur. If it
did, it would be socially beneficial. In this country many surgical pro-
cedures are performed unnecessarily, and the amount of surgery per-
formed in any geographic area is related to the number of surgeons
in that area.59 On the other hand, the number of physicians willing
to give first contact primary or family care is in short supply. 60 More-
over, the differential in income between surgeon and primary care
physician is usually greater than the differential in malpractice pre-
miums,"1 and for those physicians who choose to specialize in surgery
for purely economic reasons, the economic rationale remains. The dif-
ferential in malpractice claims creates an incentive in the right direc-
tion (i.e. away from surgery), but that incentive is not strong enough
to reduce the number of physicians who are being trained in oversup-
plied specialties.
Physician Migration. Other things being equal, differentials in
insurance premiums by geographic area could have an effect on quality
by causing physician migration from areas of excess physician supply
to those which are undersuppied or vice versa. The net effect of such
migration is not likely to be observed, however, because of the large
size of premium areas62 and the difficulty of taking account of all other
57. To the extent that physicians are able to pass on the high cost of insurance to
patients, the impact on entry into the profession would, of course, be even smaller.
58. The Insurance Services Office rates for California would require a premium pay-
ment of $6,074 by an internist who performs no surgery for $100,000/300,000 policy
limits. The same coverage for certain surgeons-gynecology, hand, head and neck, plas-
tic-would cost $37,066, according to the ISO ratings. INsURANcE SEnvicEs OFFICE,
PHYSICIANS, SURGEONS AND DENTIsTs PROFEsSIONAL LIABILITY MANUAL (Jan. 1, 1976,
Revision) (California P.S. & D. Rates, Seventh Reprint).
59. See Bunker, Surgical Manpower: A Comparison of Operations in the United
States and in England and Wales, 282 NEw ENO. J. MED. 135 (1970); Lewis, Variations
in the Incidence of Surgery, 281 NEw ENG. J. MED. 880 (1969).
60. But cf. Crowley, supra note 55, at 1365-66; Wall Street J., Oct. 31, 1975, at
1, col. 1.
61. The average gross income for surgeons during 1973 has been estimated at
approximately $97,000, CENTER FOR HEALTH SERVIcES, supra note 56, at 191 Table 62,
and 201 Table 72, some $18,000 more than the estimated 1973 gross income of the
general practitioner, id.
62. In California, for example, the ISO rates apply to the entire state, with no geo-
graphic differentiation. INSURANCE SEavicaS OFFtcE, supra note 58. Virginia, by con-
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factors. A doctor practicing in an inner city area where there is an
undersupply of physicians, for example, is likely to pay the same mal-
practice premium as one who practices in the oversupplied suburbs of
the same city, 3 meaning that little incentive exists for him to remain
in the inner city and implying that quality might well suffer in that sit-
uation. Even in the instance of a premium differential favoring the
inner city, the motivation for leaving may be so strong as to outweigh
the relatively trivial incentive (for staying) of lower malpractice in-
surance costs.
Discouragement of Part-Time Practice. Malpractice premiums
that are not adjusted to reflect decreased risk exposure in part-time
practice could force many part-time physicians out of practice, and thus
decrease the availability of care. Insofar as these physicians have
characteristics that are associated with being less technically compe-
tent, such as being older or simply not doing enough procedures to
remain competent, then their removal from practice would raise the
level of care provided. Unfortunately, the characteristics of physicians
who choose to work part-time has not been systematically documented.
Many physicians may steadily practice until they die at some advanced
age; others may practice only sporadically over a large part of their
careers. Thus, on average, discouragement of part-time practice may
be a positive result of high malpractice premiums. On the other hand,
the practice of medicine by competent, young, female physicians and
by academic physicians, many of whom see patients on a part-time
basis, would also be eliminated. Other less discriminatory means
should be found to accomplish the objective of removing from practice
the incompetent part-time practitioner.
Performance of Surgery by Primary Care Physicians. Premium
differentials between primary care specialists who do not perform sur-
gery and those who do are large. For instance, in 1976 the general
practitioner in Southern California who does not do surgery may have
a premium of about $7,000; one who does may have a premium of
about $21,000. An internist in the same area may pay about $5,000;
if he does bronchoscopy, his premium may increase to about $10,000.64
trast, is divided into three rating territories. BUREAU OF INSURANCE, STATE CORP.
COMM'N (Virginia), MEDICAL MALPRACTICE INSURANCE IN VIRGINIA: THE SCOPE AND
SEVERITY OF THE PROBLEM AND ALTERNATIVE SOLUTIONS 13 (1975).
63. See, e.g., id. (Nov. 1, 1975, Revision) (New York P.S. & D. Rates, Third Re-
print) (indicating that ISO rates for New York City and suburban Nassau County are
identical).
64. The figures in the text are based on personal communications between the
authors and insurance officials in California. The most recent published ratings of the
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Since general practitioners do surgery less frequently than surgeons,
this premium disparity could make surgery by general practitioners un-
profitable. To make it profitable, practitioners could choose to increase
either the amount of surgery they do or the prices they charge. But the
surgery market in many areas is becoming saturated, and prices for sur-
gery are likely to be fixed by surgeons and fiscal intermediaries. It is
improbable, then, that general practitioners will be able to increase
either the amount or price of their surgery. High malpractice premiums
thus may increase the likelihood that surgery will be done by surgeons
instead of general practitioners. If surgery performed by family prac-
titioners is of poorer quality than that performed by surgeons (this is
the accepted belief), then the quality of care will rise as general practi-
tioners are drawn out of the surgical market.
The performance of special procedures is another matter. A
specialist in pulmonary disease may be called upon to do only about
thirty bronchoscopies a year. If he receives $200 per bronchoscopy,
then his gross receipts would be $6,000. His net receipts would be less
than the additional malpractice premium he must pay.65 The incentive
would be either to do more-presumably unnecessary-bronchos-
copies, or to stop doing them. Either result is bad. In the first case,
patients will be subjected unnecessarily to risky procedures, and in the
latter a necessary procedure may become relatively unavailable, at least
in some communities or facilities.
Cost of Care. Physicians faced with rising malpractice premiums
will likely try to pass that cost on to their patients. A primary care
physician seeing twenty patients a day for 200 days per year has 4,000
patient visits. If his premium increases $5,000 for that year, he may
well increase his office visit by $1. This is not an insignificant increase.
Where groups of patients such as the poor who are eligible for Medicaid
are involved, the desire on the part of the physician to raise fees may
be particularly burdensome, for the reason that fee schedules are deter-
Insurance Services Office indicate that a Southern California general practitioner who
performs no surgery would pay a $6,074 annual premium in 1976 for $100,000/300,000
malpractice coverage, plus additional charges for corporate or partnership liability or em-
ployment status. A general practitioner performing certain minor procedures-including
angiography, arteriography, catheterization, and needle biopsy-would pay $18,216.
The annual premium for an internist who does not perform surgical procedures also
would be $6,074 for $100,000/300,000 coverage, while the internist who does minor sur-
gery would pay $11,121 for the same protection. INsURANCE SERvicEs OFFICE, supra
note 58. The ISO ratings, of course, are not binding on insurance companies, which
must seek state approval for rates.
65. The added premium of $5,000, see note 64 supra and accompanying text, would
almost surely exceed the physician's net income from $6,000 in revenue.
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mined by the state, and not by the physician. Thus, the option of rais-
ing fees is not really open to those physicians who practice in areas with
large numbers of Medicaid patients. In order to maintain income,
those physicians could move to non-Medicaid areas, refuse to take
Medicaid patients, see more patients more quickly, increase the num-
ber of procedures ordered, or raise fees to non-Medicaid patients. All
these options would have a deleterious impact on the general level of
medical care, by reducing the availability of care to those who need
it most or by decreasing the quality of care provided.
Entrance to Solo Practice. High malpractice premiums may make
it harder for young physicians to enter solo fee-for-service practice.
Physicians just entering practice might of necessity take positions in
group practices or Health Maintenance Organizations (HMOs), even if
such positions were not the desired career paths. This result could be
viewed as an infringement on the right of a physician to practice medi-
cine in the setting of his choice. At present, there is no evidence to
suggest that such a result will occur; nevertheless, if it did, the effect
on quality might well be positive. HMOs probably deliver slightly
better care, on the average, than does the fee-for-service system.6
High malpractice premiums, then, might increase the competitive
advantage of HMOs vis-h-vis the fee-for-service system. 67
Physician Strikes. Finally, the possibility remains that many
physicians may stop or curtail providing services in protest against high
premiums. 8 Why physicians have chosen to strike on this issue is
unclear. Other equally important cost issues-the rising prices of a
hospital day, a medical instrument, or a drug, for example-have been
ignored. Physician strikes are likely to generate onerous solutions to
the malpractice crisis, ones requiring greater government regulation of
physicians-an outcome strenuously opposed in the past by organized
medicine. 9 In the short run, the most important effect of high mal-
66. See Shapiro, Williams, Yerby, et at., Patterns of Medical Use by the Indigent
Aged Under Two Systems of Medical Care, 57 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 784 (1967);
Shapiro, Weiner & Densen, Comparison of Prematurity and Perinatal Mortality in a
General Population and in the Population of a Prepaid Group Practice Medical Care
Plan, 48 AM. J. Pu3. HEALTH 170 (1958).
67. For a general discussion of HMOs and the malpractice issue, see Bovbjerg, The
Medical Malpractice Standard of Care: HMO's and Customary Practice, 1975 DuXn
L.. 1375.
68. See note 10 supra.
69. See, e.g. Association of Am. Physicians & Surgeons v. Weinberger, 395 F. Supp.
125 (N.D. 111. 1975), appeal dismissed sub nom. Association of Am. Physicians & Sur-
geons v. Mathews, 44 U.S.L.W. 3304 (U.S. Nov. 18, 1975) (unsuccessful constitutional
challenge of PSRO legislation).
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practice premiums on quality may be that of causing physician strikes,
and consequently making care unavailable to many people in time of
need. Long-range solutions to the problems of malpractice need to be
designed, but the current crisis must be controlled before it produces
substantial harm.
In summary, the direct effects of the increasing cost of mal-
practice premiums on the quality of national medical care appear to be
minor and somewhat unpredictable. Minor changes that favor im-
proved quality, such as decreasing the number of family practitioners
who do surgery or decreasing the number of part-time physicians, may
occur. On the other hand, some necessary procedures may become
less readily available, and care in general may become less available
to disadvantaged members of society. On balance, changes in current
malpractice premium-setting should be formulated without considering
the potential effects discussed above, because those effects involve
fundamental questions about health care delivery which should be
addressed on their own merits and because the relationship between
higher premiums and those effects is ambiguous at best.
Disciplinary Actions Against Physicians
A major effect of the current malpractice system on quality of care
could occur after the resolution of a malpractice claim, in the form of
disciplinary action (or inaction) against either a physician or hospital by
some official organization. To examine this contention, three principal
factors need to be considered. First, results from analysis of data col-
lected even five years ago may be irrelevant. Second, contemplated
disciplinary actions can vary widely, from loss of license, to suspension
or restriction of licensure, to mandated continuing education. Third,
no longer will a small subgroup of physicians be identified by malprac-
tice insurance claims; thus, disciplining physicians on the basis of their
having been sued turns into the more generic issue of disciplining
physicians in general. Data from a study performed in Maryland"
indicated that only ten percent of the physicians in that state were sued
in the decade from 1960 to 1970. In the past decade a physician's
being sued was a relatively rare event; however, the figure for the
decade from 1975 to 1985 could be fifty to seventy-five percent, a
number which could translate a rare event into a common phenomenon.
Disciplinary Measures Past and Present. Disciplinary actions in
the past have been few in number, especially at the level of state
70. Evans, Hemelt & Olsson, supra note 47, at 623; see Pabst, supra note 47, at 632.
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licensure boards, where disciplinary measures range from notices of
deficiency to license revocations. Prior to this year, physicians in all
but three states were licensed for life; five additional states have
enacted relicensure provisions during the 1975 legislative sessions. 71
In the last ten years, 0.66 percent of physicians in the United States
had difficulty with licensing boards; about one half of these physicians
suffered a major disciplinary action such as suspension of licensure.72
Most disciplinary actions are for drug or alcohol abuse, unethical
behavior, or advertising infractions; only rarely is such a proceeding
initiated on grounds of medical incompetence or malpractice. 73  Only
eighteen states have statutes in effect which specifically mention pro-
fessional incompetence as justification for removal of a medical
licensure. 74
State medical societies have not been involved significantly in
physician discipline. Their actions are not public, and only rarely are
the consequences severe; ultimate punishment would be expulsion
from the society. As recently as 1965, only nine state medical societies
even specified incompetence as a reason for disciplining a member.75
And in 1969, only fourteen physicians in the United States were ex-
pelled from their respective state medical societies; another fourteen
were suspended. 76
Extent of Disciplinary Action. In the past ten years, perhaps 0.1
percent of United States physicians have been disciplined on the
grounds of medical incompetence. Between 1969 and 1973, seven
states with a physician population totaling 23,000 reported no disciplin-
ary action whatsoever. 77  At the other extreme, California disciplined
0.58 percent of its physicians, while in the five states with the most
physicians other than California, 0.11 percent were disciplined. 7
Estimates of the number of medically incompetent physicians
71. See notes 105-08 infra and accompanying text. See generally Derbyshire, Bet-
ter Licensure Laws for Better Patient Care, Hosp. PRAcnrcE 152-56, 158, 164 (Sept.
1972).
72. Derbyshire, Medical Ethics and Discipline, 228 J.A.M.A. 59, 61 (1974).
73. Id.
74. Derbyshire, Disciplining the Incompetent Physician, Hosp. PRAMcc 14047
(June 1971). See also Kansas State Bd. of Healing Arts v. Foote, 200 Kan. 477, 436
P.2d 828 (1968) (court sustained board's revocation of medical license for incompetence
even though statute did not state incompetence as grounds for revocation).
75. Derbyshire, What Should the Profession Do About the Incompetent Physician?,
194 J.A.M.A. 119 (1965), discussed in Derbyshire, supra note 74, at 140.
76. Derbyshire, supra note 74, at 141.




range from three to five percent.79  Thus, the current system disci-
plines one thirtieth to one fiftieth of the incompetent physicians."0
Clearly, all disciplinary systems, including the malpractice system, have
not been very effective in dealing with the problem of incompetent
practice.
There is little hope that the malpractice system will contribute to
a solution of this important problem. Even if licensure boards were
to conduct routine reviews of those doctors who lost malpractice claims,
the use of this information as a screening device for instituting dis-
ciplinary actions would be very inefficient and possibly misleading,
since ever greater numbers of physicians are being sued. Eventually,
the state licensure board might be reviewing virtually all physicians.
Furthermore, the social stigma of being sued will decrease as the per-
centage of doctors being sued increases. Finally, in the absence of
other information concerning a physician's practice, analysis of malprac-
tice claims is unlikely to be a useful mechanism through which physi-
cians could be disciplined. This function should be part of a quality
assurance system which will generate extensive data about the nature
and quality of a physician's practice. The addition of information about
malpractice claims to these data would be redundant. In any event,
the crucial issue is not the collection of data, but whether the quality
assurance system will use that data to improve care or, if necessary,
discipline physicians.
The Effect of the Malpractice System on the Doctor-Patient Relation-
ship
Most of the arguments that relate changes in the current
malpractice system to changes in the level of quality provided focus on
altering the doctor-patient relationship. Alterations which have been
postulated to occur are: (1) increased responsibility of the health care
provider for assurance of adequate patient outcomes; (2) performance
of more laboratory procedures and tests to verify or correct clinical
judgments; (3) discouragement of the use of innovative procedures;
79. Nelson, Incompetent Doctors: Few Lose License, L.A. Times, July 21, 1975,
at 1, col. 1. A recent study indicated -that six percent of the physicians who were treat-
ing Medicaid patients in New Mexico gave forty percent of the injections judged to be
medically inappropriate. R. BROOK & K. WiLLTAMS, supra note 32.
80. If three percent of physicians are incompetent and only 0.1 percent are disci-
plined, then a simple division yields the result that 3.3 percent, or one thirtieth, of in-
competent physicians actually are disciplined. With the five percent estimate of in-




(4) increased use of consultants; (5) discouragement of the delegation
of responsibility, for instance to physician assistants; (6) a raised level
of caution manifested by increased medical recordkeeping; and (7)
development of a suspicious and adversary environment between
patient and doctor.
That each of these statements is value-laden is obvious. Virtually,
all the positive statements could be written in a negative formulation
and vice versa. Both facts and an explicit value system are needed
if an adequate understanding of the impact of malpractice on the
doctor-patient relationship is to occur. Unfortunately, there is a dearth
of information available on the subject.81
The central features of many of the points raised above involve
the notion of defensive medicine. Modem medical science has pro-
duced an ever increasing number of costly procedures and tests which
can in some cases supply vital medical information and are for the most
part harmless. A skull X-ray series for a child with a possible head
injury is an example. The issue at hand is whether these tests are per-
formed to protect against malpractice suits or to benefit the patient.
Some data suggest that virtually no procedures are done to protect
against malpractice,8 2 but former Secretary of Health, Education and
Welfare Caspar Weinberger has stated that $3 to $7 billion may be
spent on defensive medicine which is of no benefit to the patient. 3
An adequate answer to this question will depend on knowledge of the
sensitivity and specificity of the tests or procedures being considered
and on the value the public places on correct diagnosis or identification
of all conditions or diseases. In any event, any further significant
jumps in malpractice premium levels may well render previous re-
search and interpretations irrelevant, because the situation in that cir-
cumstance would simply not be comparable to the present. It seems
reasonable to predict that so-called defensive medicine may indeed rise
as a consequence of additional increases in malpractice premiums of
the magnitude of increases to date.
Use of Tests, Procedures, and Consultants. Consider, for in-
stance, a cancer screening test. Assume that the prevalence of the
cancer in the population is one in a hundred, the sensitivity of the test
(the ability of a test to detect a disease if it is present), is 0.99, and
the specificity of the test (the ability of a test to determine that the
person does not have the disease given that the disease is absent) is
81. See Bernzweig, Defensive Medicine, in MEDICAL MALPRACTICE REPORT Ap-
pendix 38.
82. Id. at 39-40; Project, The Medical Malpractice Threat: A Study of Defensive
Medicine, 1971 DuKE L.L 939.




The following table indicates what would happen if the screening
test were applied to 10,000 people:
Test Result True Result Total
Disease Present Disease Absent
Disease present a b a + b
Disease absent c d c + d
Total a- +e= 100 b+ d= 9900 10,000
Sensitivity = a/(a + c) = a/100 = 0.99
a = 99; c = 1
Specificity = d/(b + d) = d/9900 = 0.99
b = 99; d = 9801
For every person who actually has the disease (cell a above), an
additional "victim" would be identified, who does not have the disease
(cell b); that is, one true positive would be identified for each false
positive. One person who actually has the disease would be missed
(cell c). If it were desirable to identify every person who has the
disease, then the 9802 people in whom the disease was declared absent
must be rescreened. The prevalence of the disease in this smaller
population is 1/9802 or 0.0001; the results of the rescreening are as
follows:
Test Result True Result Total
Disease Present Disease Absent
Disease Present a b a + b
Disease Absent c d c + d
Total a-c=1 b+d=9801 9802
Sensitivity = a/(a + c) = a/1 = 0.99a'- 1;ec_0
Specificity = d/(b + d) d/9801 - 0.99
b = 98; d = 9703
Applying the test to this population twice would result in the
identification of 100 true positives, zero false negatives, and 197 false
positives. In order to decide whether the second application of this
test to a population is worth the cost, society must place a value on the
desirability of detecting every patient with the disease; the value of
the harm done to patients falsely labeled as positive must be compared to
the good done to those labeled as true positives. Physicians, regardless
of the "malpractice crisis," are trained to err on the side of aggressive
management of patients; in the face of uncertainty, they prefer to act,
84. The three statistics chosen represent a very favorable screening situation. Vir-
tually all tests are heither so specific nor sensitive; prevalence of the disease is usually
on the order of one in a thousand.
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not to wait. Determination of whether this represents "good" or "bad"
defensive medicine must await a value judgment by society. With-
out an explicit value judgment, some people will argue that dual appli-
cation of the hypothesized screening test is evidence of the harmful
effects of the malpractice issue on quality of care, and other observers
will take the opposite view.85
The malpractice situation is even more complex than that illustrated
by the application of a no-risk screening test to the population.
Modem therapeutics have produced potent medicines and proce-
dures (e.g., certain cancer chemotherapies, bone marrow transplants)
which may, at great monetary cost; extend the life of a few while pro-
ducing little benefit to many. How should these therapies be applied?
If they are not considered by a physician, is a malpractice claim justi-
fied? If they are used and produce harm in some patients, as they
certainly must, is a malpractice claim justified? Unless society de-
velops an explicit system to ,address these questions, value judgments
concerning the relationship between malpractice and the level of qual-
ity of care delivered will be difficult to make in the future.
In the past few years, physicians have begun to set process criteria
which describe what they should do to the patient in order to deliver
good care. When these criteria have been applied to actual medical
practice, the number of procedures performed (including X-rays)
appears to be inadequate by a factor of two or three.8 6 From the view-
point of the malpractice issue, no evidence supports the contention that
procedures which otherwise have no social value are performed simply
for the sake of avoiding malpractice suits. On the other hand, evidence
to support the notion that the threat of malpractice litigation increases
the performance of useful procedures is also absent, at least in part
because changes in physician behavior are difficult to accomplish and
require concerted effort. 87  Substantial improvements in physician
behavior are certainly not produced by the threat of malpractice sanc-
tions; otherwise major deficiencies in medical practice would not
continue to be identified in quality-of-care studies.
Medical Recordkeeping. Some observers have suggested that the
threat of malpractice suits has led to increased medical recordkeeping
85. The system-wide consequences of defensive medicine should not be too easily
dismissed, especially as they relate to higher costs, patient well-being, misallocation of
funds or manpower, and general system performance in the face of scarce resources.
Research is needed to address these issues within today's malpractice environment, if
realistic appraisals and predictions are desired about the situation tomorrow.
86. See B. PAYNE & T. LYONS, OFFICE CARE STUDY, supra note 28; B. PAYNE & T.
LYONS, EPISODE OF ILLNESS STUDY, supra note 28.
87. See Williamson, Alexander & Miller, Continuing Education and Patient Care
Research: Physician Response to Screening Test Results, 201 .A.M.A. 938, 942 (1967).
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and thereby to a better quality of care.8  No studies have been per-
formed to support this opinion. Clearly the value of greater record-
keeping is related to the use of this information in future patient
management. Recording information just as a protection for court pro-
ceedings is a waste of expensive physician time. Unfortunately, the
threshold beyond which recording findings becomes wasted effort is
unknown. Moreover, evidence suggests that the critical element in
medical care delivery may be the reliability with which a history is
taken and physical findings are elicited; 9 the recording of information
then becomes of secondary importance.
A definitive answer to whether the malpractice system leads to
better quality of care by way of increased recording of medical informa-
tion must await studies which determine the value of this additional in-
formation. The results of these studies probably will indicate that de-
tailed recording of information produces little patient benefit. Thus,
this malpractice effect will be one of decreasing slightly the efficiency
of the medical care system.
Traditional Doctor-Patient Relationship. Finally, it is asserted
that the malpractice situation is aggravating the dissolution of the "tradi-
tional" doctor-patient relationship. Again, in the absence of data to
test this assertion, one can only argue that all institutions of society are
in a state of decay-whether they be marriage, the family, or govern-
ment. The times suggest that, even in the absence of the the malprac-
tice crisis, the conventional doctor-patient relationship (authority figure
versus dependent figure) would be deteriorating; in the future, the
status of the patient and the physician may be more nearly equal.
Disappearance of the conventional doctor-patient relationship, whether
or not aggravated by the malpractice crisis, may be a social good which
will lead to a greater willingness by the patient to assume more
responsibility for his own health.
In summary, there is little information available to answer the
question of the effect of the current or future malpractice system on
the quality of medical care. Furthermore, even if such information
were available, its interpretation would be impossible until society
determines what amount of health it wants at what price. In the
absence of such information, rhetoric which supports either side of the
issue will be heavy, but its impact on policy, one hopes, will be minimal.
88. Roemer, Controlling and Promoting Quality in Medical Care, 35 LAw &
CoNTisr. PEOB. 284, 297 (1970). But cf. Lyons & Payne, The Relationship of Physi-
cians' Medical Recording Performance to Their Medical Care Performance, 12 MED.
CARE 463 (1974); R. BROOK & A. AvERY, supra note 42, at 27.
89. Koran, The Reliability of Clinical Methods, Data and Judgments (pts. 1-2) 293
NEw ENG. J. MED. 642, 695 (1975).
Vol. 1975:1197] 1221
DUKE LAW JOURNAL
PoLIcY AND RESEARCH IMPLICATIONS
The discussion above is characterized by a marked lack of data.
Indeed, any relationship between the malpractice crisis and deteriora-
tion or improvement in quality of care is established mainly through
inappropriate generalization from sparse data and deductive reasoning,
except insofar as malpractice is a crystal-clear reflection of poor quality
of care in general. The impact of the threat of a malpractice claim
on improving the level of quality of care appears to be miniscule when
compared to the impact of other factors in the medical care system
which dictate the level of quality of care provided. Similarly, no evi-
dence substantiates the assertion that the threat of a malpractice claim
seriously impairs the level of patient care provided. The immediate
conclusion, then, is that in resolving the malpractice crisis of the 1970s,
considerations other than quality should be given a much heavier
weight.
Nevertheless, some tentative conclusions can be advanced which
permit suggestions for research studies and policy to be made. First,
the issue of sanctioning the physician should be separated from that of
compensating the patient. A fair system for compensating the patient
must be developed, whether that be through a no-fault insurance sys-
tem,00 an arbitration mechanism, or through some form of life or dis-
ability insurance. Second, separation of physician sanction from patient
compensation should be done carefully, so that resolution of the first
issue does not lead to a distortion of the quality of care provided.
Third, the opportunity that the present malpractice crisis provides for
increasing the accountability of the medical care system, especially
physicians and hospitals, should not be squandered; physician insistence
on having the government involved in solving a medical care delivery
problem is not likely to occur again in the near future.9' Unfortu-
nately, early attempts by state legislatures and the federal government
to solve the malpractice crisis may have worsened the quality-of-care
problem.2
90. For discussions of the feasibility of nonfault compensation systems for medical
accidents, compare O'Connell, No-Fault Insurance for Injuries Arising from Medical
Treatment: A Proposal for Elective Coverage, 24 EMORY L.. 21 (1975), with Keeton,
Compensation for Medical Accidents, 121 U. PA. L. REv. 590 (1973).
91. It should be recognized that this Article addresses a rather narrow issue with
respect to malpractice, namely the performance and accountability of physicians. This
emphasis should be placed in context, however, and acknowledgement made of -the need
for other parties to be held equally accountable in the malpractice environment. The
quality assurance movement is a viable force in medicine today, and a variety of peer
review mechanisms have been established throughout the country; the time is here for
the legal profession, the insurance industry, and other principals (e.g., politicians) of
the malpractice issue to bring the same discipline to bear on their own activities.
92. Early legislation duplicates various activities of PSROs and of some new bodies
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All but three state legislatures have dealt with the malpractice
issue in 1975. 3 Twenty-eight states have enacted laws; thirty-eight
states have established special malpractice study commissions to pre-
pare legislation for 1976 sessions." An examination of these bills
reveals an effort by state legislators to improve the quality of medical
care provided as they modify the malpractice system in favor of the
physician by, for example, decreasing physician liability or limiting the
award size. Laws in ten states require all malpractice claims (or, in
some cases, awards and settlements) to be reported to appropriate state
boards, the insurance committee, or the legislature.95  Michigan, 90
Ohio,97 Nevada,98 Florida,99 and Oregon 00 have enacted legislation
which requires health care providers, screening panels, medical socie-
ties, and hospital review committees to report instances of possible mal-
practice, questionable professional conduct, or professional incom-
petence to the state licensing board. This requirement is intended to
precipitate an investigation when reports of sufficient urgency or num-
created at the state level. This will undoubtedly lead to jurisdictional confusion, with
overlapping of responsibility in some areas and neglect of tasks in others. To promote
the highest possible care, a more streamlined approach is clearly needed, implying a con-
solidation of efforts at one level or another.
93. According to a survey conducted by Rudolf L. Brutoco, one of the authors of
this Article, in 1975, the three states which had not taken some legislative steps in the
medical malpractice area were Virginia, Wyoming, and Mississippi.
94. See Table I. For a general discussion of the state legislative response to the
current malpractice crisis, see Comment, An Analysis of State Legislative Responses to
the Medical Malpractice Crisis, 1975 DuKE L.J. 1417.
95. Act of Mar. 3, 1975, Act 306, § 1, [1975] Ark. Gen. Acts; Medical Injury Com-
pensation Reform Act, § 2.3, [1975] West's Cal. Legis. Service No. 9, at 3771, 3775-78
(codified at CA.. Bus. & PRou. CODE §§ 801(a), 802, 803, 805); Medical Malpractice
Reform Act of 1975, ch. 75-9, § 5, [1975] West's Fla. Sess. Law Service No. 1, at 7,
10-11 (codified at FLA. STAT. ANN. § 768.133(2)); IND. ANN. STAT. § 16-9.5-6(1)
(Burns Supp. 1975); Ch. 241, [April 9, 19751 Kan. Sess. Laws 647-48; Pub. Act No. 44,
§ 1, [19751 West's Mich. Legis.. Service No. 1, at 95, 95-96 (codified at MUcH. Cow,.
ANN. § 500.2477); Ch. 302, § 6, [1975] Nev. Stat. (codified at Nav. REv. STAT., tit. 3
(1973)); Act of May 21, 1975, ch. 109, § 2, [1975] McKinney's Sess. Law Service of
N.Y. No. 4, at 134, 135 (codified at N.Y. INs. LAw § 335); Act of Sept. 13, 1975,
ch. 796, § 10, [19751 Ore. Laws (codified at ORE. REv. STAT. § 743); Health Care
Services Malpractice Act, Act 111, §§ 401, 702(c), [1975] Purdon's Pa. Legis. Service
No. 2, at 296, 299, 303 (codified at PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 40, §§ 1301.401, 1301.702(c)).
96. Pub. Act No. 106, § 1, [1975] West's Mich. Legis. Service No. 3, at 196 (codi-
fied at Mice. CoM. LAws ANN. § 338.109a) (osteopaths); Pub. Act No. 107, § Ila,
[19751 West's Mich. Legis. Service No. 3, at 197 (codified at Micr. Cow,. LAws ANN.
§ 338.1811a) (physicians); Pub. Act No. 111, § 12(4), [1975] West's Mich. Legis.
Service No. 3, at 220 (codified at Mice. CoMP. LAws ANN. § 331.442) (hospitals).
97. Act of July 28, 1975, [1975] Page's Legis. Bull. No. 3, at 174, 182 (codified at
Omro REv. CoDE ANN. § 4731.22(C) (2)).
98. Ch. 303, § 9(1), [1975] Nev. Stat. (codified at NE. REv. STAT. § 630.9(1)).
99. Medical Malpractice Reform Act of 1975, ch. 75-9, § 12, [1975] West's Fla.
Sess. Law Service No. 1, at 15 (codified at Fr.LA. STAT. ANN. § 458.1201(1) (p)).
100. Ch. 796, § 6(2), [19751 Ore. Laws (codified at Oln. REV. STAT. § 677).
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ber about one health care provider are received. (Indeed, some states,
e.g., Massachusetts, 0 1 statutorily require that all "complaints relating
to the proper practice of medicine" be investigated.) Such communi-
cations are confidential and individuals making these reports are pro-
tected by law from liability, as are members of the review committee.
Patient grievance mechanisms also are being implemented in some
states. Colorado, for instance, requires an investigation of any sworn
complaint for reasonable cause.102  Eleven states have substantially
broadened the basis for disciplinary actions by including substandard
or incompetent care as sufficient cause for disciplining a physician. 0"
The range of disciplinary actions available to state licensure boards
has also been increased. Previously, probation, suspension, and revo-
cation of license were the basic means of punishment. Certain state
boards can now fine a health care provider, require specific additional
schooling, issue public reprimands, or restrict a provider's practice to
specified areas of competency (e.g., a practitioner could be prohibited
from performing surgery or specific surgical procedures). 10 4 The
availability of these less drastic disciplinary measures is important
because the existence of only relatively severe sanctions has led to -the
tendency to take no action at all except in the most extreme cases.
Oregon has empowered the Board of Medical Examiners to suspend
101. Act of June 19, 1975, ch. 362, § 3, [1975] Adv. Legis. Service No. 5, at 316
(codified at MASS. ANN. LAws ch. 112, § 5).
102. H.B. 1557, § 2 (Colo. 1975).
103. Medical Injury Compensation Reform Act, § 16, [1975] West's Cal. Legis.
Service No. 9, at 3786 (codified at CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 2361(c)); H.B. 252,
§ 1 (Colo. 1975); Medical Malpractice Reform Act of 1975, ch. 75-9, § 12; West's
Fla. Sess. Law Service No. 1, at 15 (codified at FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 458.1201(m), (o),
(p)); IND. ANN. STAT. § 16-9.5-6(2) (Bums Supp. 1975); Act of June 19, 1975, ch.
362, § 3, [1975] Adv. Legis. Service No. 5, at 316 (codified at MAss. ANN. LAws ch.
112, § 5(c)); Pub. Act No. 143, § 1, [1975] West's Mich. Legis. Service No. 3, at
288 (codified at MICE. COMP. LAws ANN. § 338.1811(2)(i)); Ch. 303, § 18, [1975]
Nev. Stat. (codified at NEv. REV. STAT. § 630.030); Act of May 21, 1975, ch. 109,
§ 30, 11975] McKinney's Sess. Law Service of N.Y. No. 4, at 154-55 (codified at N.Y.
EDuc. LAw § 6509(2)); N.C. GEN. STAT. 90-14(6) (Adv. Legis. Service No. 5, 1975);
Act of July 28, 1975, [1975] Page's Legis. Bull. No. 3, at 174, 182 (codified at Omo
REv. CODE ANN. § 4731.22(B)(6)); ch. 796, § 2, [1975] Ore. Laws (codified at ORE.
REv. STAT. §§ 677.190(15), (16)).
104. Medical Injury Compensation Reform Act, § 22, -[1975 West's Cal. Legis. Serv-
ice No. 9, at 3787 (codified at CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 2372.5); Medical Malpractice
Reform Act of 1975, ch. 75-9, § 12, 11975] West's Fla. Sess. Law Service No. 1, at 15
(codified at FLA. STAT. ANN. § 458.1201(3)(a)); Act of June 19, 1975, ch. 362, § 3,
[1975] Adv. Legis. Service No. 5, at 316 (codified at MAss. ANN. LAws ch. 112, § 5)
(reprimand); Act of July 28, 1975, [1975] Page's Legis. Bull. No. 3, at 174, 181 (codi-
fied at OHIo REv. CODE ANN. § 4731.22(B)); ch. 796, § 3, [1975] Ore. Laws (codified
at ORE. REv. STAT. § 677.205(2)(e)); Health Care Services Malpractice Act, Act No.
111, § 901, [1975] Purdon's Pa. Legis. Service No. 2, at 305-06 (codified at PA. STAT.
ANN. tit. 40, § 1301.901).
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the physician's license temporarily without a hearing when permitting the
physician to continue to practice medicine would constitute an imme-
diate danger to the public,10 5 thereby preventing in the most extreme
case the occurrence of additional injury during the process of formal
litigation and hearings. In 1971, New Mexico became the first state
to require continuing education and periodic relicensure. 10 6 Eight
states now require post-licensure education, ranging from fifteen to
fifty hours per year.10 7  Six states have passed laws which require phy-
sicians to take a competency examination upon demand by the licens-
ing board.108
At the federal level, the Kennedy-Inouye bill 109 contains several
intended quality assurance provisions, including: the establishment of
national licensure and relicensure standards;" 0 the requirement of
PSRO review of participating physicians;"' the evaluation of practi-
tioners who lose a large number of malpractice claims;" 2 the require-
ment of concurring consultation for any elective surgery;"' and the
105. Ch. 796, § 3, [1975] Ore. Laws 250, amending ORE REv. STAT. § 677.205(3).
106. Act of Mar. 24, 1971, ch. 135, § 1, [1971] N.M. Laws 396 (codified at N.M.
STAT. ANN. § 67-5-3(E) (1974)), amending N.M. STAT. ANN. § 67-5-3 (1953).
107. Medical Injury Compensation Reform Act, § 11, [1975] West's Cal. Legis.
Service No. 9, at 3779-80 (codified at CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 2101.6); Pub. Act
No. 79-1136 (H.B. 1964) (11. 1975); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 65-2809 (1972) (education
requirement at the discretion of the State Board of Healing Arts); ANN. CODE MD. §
43-128(c) (Supp. 1975) (education requirement at the discretion of the State Board of
Medical Examiners); Act of June 13, 1975, Pub. Act No. 112, § 1, [1975] West's Mich.
Legis. Service No. 3, at 221 (codified at MIcH. ComT. LAws ANN. § 338.1810(7));
N.M. STAT. ANN. § 67-5-3(E) (1974); Act of July 28, 1975, [1975] Page's Legis. Bull.
No. 3, at 174, 182 (codified at Omo REv. CODE ANN. § 4731.281(A)); Act of July
23, 1975, ch. 37, § 10, [1975] West's Wis. Legis. Service No. 1, at 41-42, as amended,
Act of Oct. 2, 1975, ch. 79, § 4, [1975] West's Wis. Legis. Service No. 2 at 434 (codi-
fied at Wis. STAT. ANN. § 655.017). Twelve state medical associations and five spe-
cialty societies have established continuing education requirements for maintenance of
membership. Ruhe, Recent Events of Special Interest to Medical Education, 234
J.A.M.A. 1326, 1327 (1975).
108. Medical Injury Compensation Reform Act, § 22, [19751 West's Cal. Legis.
Service No. 9, at 3787 (codified at CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 2372.5(a)) (competency
exam after the completion of additional training); Ch. 303, § 20, [1975] Nev. Stat.
(codified at NEv. REv. STAT. § 630.140(2)); N.C. GEN. SrAT. 90-14(11) (Adv. Legis.
Service No. 5, 1975); Act of July 28, 1975, [1975] Page's Legis. Bull. No. 3, at 174,
182 (codified at Omno REv. CODE ANN. § 4731.22(B)(16)); Act of Sept. 13, 1975,
ch. 796, § 7, [1975] Ore. Laws (codified at ORE. REv. STAT. § 677.-); Act of Apr.
5, 1975, ch. 61, § 3(2), [1975] Wash. Legis. Service No. 1, at 84 (codified at WASH.
REV. CODE ANN. § 18.72.275). The competency examinations in California, Nevada,
North Carolina, and Oregon test a doctor's medical knowledge and skills; those in Ohio
and Washington examine his mental and physical competence to practice medicine.
109. S. 215, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. (1975) (National Medical Injury Compensation
Insurance Act of 1975).
110. Id. § 1731.
111. Id. § 1725.
112. Id. § 1707(b).
113. Id. § 1704(c)(3).
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establishment of provider responsibility for informing patients of
adverse results, on the threat of personal liability.114
This survey of the laws which have been passed or are pending
in state legislatures and the Congress produced the expected results.
Emphasis is on reporting instances of incompetency, continuing edu-
cation and relicensure, and broadening the effectiveness of state
licensure boards. In many ways these legislative actions foster a piece-
meal approach to quality assurance. In part they duplicate the activi-
ties of the PSRO and PEP and, except for the Kennedy-Inouye pro-
posals, do little to strengthen them. Relicensure and educational activi-
ties will improve care only if deficiency in cognitive knowledge is the
major problem in the delivery of better health care. If a physician's
habits and behavior, such as his willingness to see a patient in the
middle of the night, are more important in determining quality than
attending courses, the impact of the relicensure procedures on quality
is likely to be severely limited. Mandatory continuing education, which
usually contains material of more interest to the educator than to the
practicing physician, and relicensure requirements may lead to the mas-
tery of material which is not relevant to the practicing physician or is
quickly forgotten.115
Tabulation and reporting of the number of physician-specific
malpractice events are also not likely to improve the quality of medical
care. In the absence of knowledge about the physician's case mix or
the number of patients he treats, the physician malpractice claim rate
will be virtually useless. Substantial time and money would be spent
in investigating such incidents, and this expenditure of resources would
likely duplicate the work being performed by whatever quality assur-
ance system exists in the area, such as PSRO. If malpractice claims
must be reported, they should be reported directly to the PSRO, where
the data at least would be concentrated in the hands of one organiza-
tion which could then generate physician profiles.116 These profiles
would be used to determine if the malpractice incident is an aberration
or represents a typical pattern of practice.
One state bil 117 and several federal bills 18 propose the establish-
114. Id. §§ 1705()(i)-(2).
115. See Brown & Uhl, Mandatory Continuing Education: Sense or Nonsense, 213
LA.M.A. 1660, 1661, 1667 (1970).
116. The PSRO would know the number of patient care activities of each physician.
117. S.B. 2873 (Wash. 1975). Other proposals, e.g., A.B. 926 (Cal. 1975); H.B.
3251 (Ore. 1975), would have established administrative mechanisms for compen-
sating the victims of iatrogenic injuries, but would have retained negligence as the deter-
ninant of provider liability.
118. See, e.g., S. 215, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. (1975); H.R. 4881, 94th Cong., 1st Sess.
(1975); H.R. 5183, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. (1975).
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ment of a no-fault insurance system. The system would identify events
that more often than not are due to physician negligence and would
compensate patients who have suffered these events without their hav-
ing to prove physician negligence. A record would be kept of the
number of physician-specific compensated events, and this record could
be used as a quality-of-care measure. Again the utility of this measure
is limited without the simultaneous collection of data which describe
the physician's patient care activities. 119
Research Opportunities
It would have been desirable to have more information to support
the conclusions stated above. Even at this late date in the policy
debate over malpractice, it would be useful to conduct studies to deter-
mine, in a more precise manner, the relationship between malpractice
and quality of care. Basic epidemiologic information about the inci-
dence and prevalence of poor physician practice and how it relates to
physician characteristics is sorely needed. Studies determining the
impact of a large malpractice claim on the patterns of practice in an
area could easily be done. For instance, emergency care provided to
injury victims could be studied in selected sites. Within a couple of
years, at least one large malpractice suit would probably occur in one
or more of these sites. Following such a suit, the quality of emergency
care could be reassessed to determine the effects, if any, of the mal-
practice suit. Similarly, studies could be designed which would
examine the change in physicians' practices when they move from a
high-malpractice situation to a low-malpractice situation, or vice versa.
For example, what changes occur when doctors leave military practice
where the malpractice claim rate is low and enter the fee-for-service
system where it is high? What happens when doctors move either
into or out of a prepaid group practice which has a low level of mal-
practice claims, or into or out of the fee-for-service system which has
a higher level of malpractice claims? Finally, perhaps the most impor-
tant question on which research is desperately needed involves the rela-
tionship between the commission of events which would be legally
compensable vis-h-vis the general level of quality of care that a provider
119. The no-fault insurance system could produce one major paradoxical effect as the
definition of a compensable event is broadened. Suppose a patient with terminal cancer
seeks treatment from a physician. If this patient died from his disease, his family would
not be compensated. If, however, he were treated with powerful drugs which perhaps
could be beneficial but were not in this case, and this treatment regimen produced or
hastened death, then the patient has suffered a compensable event and his family would
be awarded restitution. Since the future economic stability of the family is considered
by many physicians when decisions about the care to be given to a -terminal patient are
made, the pressure would be on the physician to make some deaths that would occur
anyway appear to be compensable events.
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renders. Research which answers these questions could greatly facili-
tate the development of a system for compensating patients which
would both provide justice to the patients who have suffered untoward
events and increase the level of quality of care rendered to all patients,
even those who have not suffered untoward events.
Concluding Remarks
Up to this point, the conclusions reached are of little use to policy-
makers. They suggest that more research is needed and that proposed
changes in the malpractice system which would include relicensure and
mandatory education are likely to be expensive and produce little
alteration in the quality of medical care. What then should be done
to take advantage of the current crisis and increase the accountability
of the medical care system?
The answer lies in trading off improvements in the entire
approach to medical malpractice protection 20 with fundamental altera-
tions of the current quality assurance system in the United States, the
PSRO. When the law containing PSRO was passed, many compro-
mises were necessary in order to gain some cooperation by the medi-
cal profession.' 21 These compromises make the PSRO system both
less public and less accountable than it could be. Furthermore, they
limit the depth and breadth of the quality assessment activities that the
PSRO is permitted to perform. In place of building an expensive
duplicate quality assurance system based on reporting malpractice
claims or on relicensure, the current PSRO quality assurance system
should be made more accountable by altering it in the following ways:
1. Local PSROs should have elected public members, and these
public members should observe, if not participate in, the technical
review of quality of care; without such public participation bad care can
too easily be hidden. 121
2. The authority of PSROs should be extended to include the
review of care given to all patients whether or not their care is financed
by the federal government; Medicaid and Medicare patients should not
be the only ones to benefit from a quality assurance program.
120. To reiterate, these improvements could take the form of significantly lower mal-
practice premiums (however accomplished), medical panel arbitration of claims, ceilings
on physicians' liability (with optional patient self-coverage for higher amounts), or some
combination of the above.
121. See 3 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 4989 (1972); STAFF OF SENATE COMM.
ON FRNANcE, 93D CONo., 2D SESs., BACKGROUND MATEIIAL RELATING To PROFESSIONAL
STANDARDs Rnviw ORGANIzATIONS (PSRO's) (Comm. Print 1974); ef. Gosfield, Con-
stuner Accountability in PSROs, 6 U. TOLEDO L. REv. 764, 770-75 (1975).
122. See Gosfield, supra note 121, at 798.
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3. The authority of PSROs should be extended to cover the
review of ambulatory as well as hospital care.
4. The results of the quality audits should be made available to
the public by PSRO area, hospital, and if necessary, by physician or
at least by a physician characteristic-such as age or board certification
status.
123
5. Standards and criteria of care should be set nationally instead
of locally; otherwise Americans in different medical care areas will be
receiving different levels of care.
6. Licensed physicians should be required to participate actively
and without compensation in the peer review activities of the PSRO;
otherwise their license should be revoked.1 24
7. The effectiveness of the PSRO in altering the quality of care
in its community should be determined by means of an external audit
prepared by an agency such as the National Center for Health Statistics
of the Department of Health, Education and Welfare; without such an
audit the validity of the PSRO's results cannot be substantiated.
8. The PSRO should be given the authority to revoke the license
of a physician. 2 5
In the long run, improving the quality of care depends on increas-
ing the public awareness of the medical care system and of what is
required to maintain one's health. This will necessitate access to infor-
mation which to date has remained hidden from public view. If the
present malpractice crisis produces legislation which alters the PSRO
system to accomplish these objectives, that outcome will go a long way
toward improving the quality of care delivered and thus the health of
the American people.. 2 6  Unfortunately these rather sweeping altera-
tions in the PSRO program by themselves may not increase the health
of the American people, unless the public demonstrates its interest in
improving its health by vigorously monitoring the program through its
elected representatives.
123. See id. at 775-89. This suggestion assumes that such analyses would be placed
in proper context, so that hospitals or physicians caring for more acutely ill patients are
not penalized.
124. Of course, physician time will not be without cost as perceived by the medical
care system. It is imperative that physician time for peer review not be considered a
"reimbursable" professional activity, but rather a professional responsibility akin to at-
tending grand rounds or keeping abreast of the medical literature.
125. For a detailed description of current quality assurance activities in the United
States, see R. BROOK & A. AVERY, supra note 42.
126. For the argument that the development of PSROs will make the malpractice suit
superfluous as a quality control device, see Simmons & Ball, PSRO and the Dissolution
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a Action in 1975: P = Proposed
L = Enacted into Law
E = Existing
bLegend
1. Requires all malpractice claims and/or settlements to be reported to governmental
agency
2. Requires reporting of repeated or gross malpractice and/or professional incompe-
tence and/or disciplinary actions to State Board by screening panels, medical socie-
ties, or hospital review committees
3. Quality assurance boards established, or state licensing boards charged with increased
responsibility for on-going monitoring of provider performance
4. Broadens basis for disciplinary action against health care providers
5. Provides for restriction of practitioners' license
6. Provides for competency examinations for continued licensure at State's discretion
7. Periodic relicensure
8. Requires continuing education
9. Requires PSRO review of services of participating providers
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cStatutes enacted or proposed in 1975 in survey: Act of Mar. 3, 1975, Act 306,
[1975] Ark. Gen. Acts; H.B. 2418 (Ariz. 1975); Medical Injury Compensation Act,
[1975] West's Cal. Legis. Service No. 9, at 3776; CoLO. R:v. STAT. ANN. § 12-36-117(1)(p) and 12-43.5-101 to 103; FLA. STAT. ANN. § 458, 768 (Supp. 1976); S.B. 1389
(Hawaii 1975); IDAo CODE ch. 41 (Supp. 1975); Pub. Act No. 79-1136 (H.B. 1964)
(Il. 1975); IND. ANN. STAT. tit. 16, § 16-9 et seq. (Bums Supp. 1975); H.F. 803,
[1975] Iowa Legis. Service No. 3; Act of Apr. 9, 1975, ch. 241, [1975 Kan. Sess. Laws
647-48; Pub. Act No. 529 (H.B. 636, (La. 1975)); MAss. ANN. LAWS ch. 112, § 5(Supp. 1976); MIcH. CoMP. LAWS ANN. § 331.422, 338.109, 338.1810 (Supp. 1976);
H.F. 1803 (Minn. 1975); Nnv. Rnv. STAT. §§ 630.003 et seq. (1975); Act of May 21,
1975, ch. 109, [1975] McKinney's Sess. Law Service of N.Y. No. 4, at 134; N.C. G-N.
STAT. 90-14(6) (Supp 1975); Omo REv. CODE ANN. § 4731 et seq. (Page Supp. 1976);
OR . REV. STAT. § 677 et seq. (Supp. 1976); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 40, § 1301 (Supp.
1976); TENN. CODE ANN. H9 23-3401 to 3421 (Supp. 1975); S.B. 635 (Tex. 1975);
S. 170, 171 (Vt. 1975); WASH. Rav. CODE ANN. §§ 18.72 et seq. (Supp. 1976); Wis.
STAT. ANN. § 655 (Supp. 1976).

